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Abstract
A simple Attacker-Defender interaction is analyzed, in which a single terrorist (denoted T ) will potentially attack a single target in the homeland of a government/state
(denoted G). This interaction is modelled as a one-shot sequential move game in which
G first chooses how heavily to defend the target, after which T chooses whether or not
to stage an attack. T ’s benefit from a successful attack is allowed to be increasing in
the amount of resources that G allocates to defense. In the context of terrorism, this
has multiple reasonable interpretations, including situations in which: (i) citizens of
the target country are terrified to a greater degree when a more heavily fortified target is successfully attacked or (ii) successfully attacking a more heavily fortified target
allows the terrorists to recruit more effectively. The amount by which T ’s benefit from
a successful attack exceeds its baseline due to increased defensive efforts by G can be
thought of as a terror effect. This specification differentiates terrorism from traditional
conflict in an important way. For the specified model, the amount of defensive efforts
by G necessary to prevent T from staging an attack is increasing in the magnitude of
the terror effect. Moreover, if G inaccurately under perceives the magnitude of the terror effect, then G may choose either less than or more than the optimal level of defense,
with the realized outcome depending upon model parameters. The results highlight the
importance for correctly understanding the payoffs and motives of terrorists in order
to be able to optimally allocate defensive resources.
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Introduction and Motivation

This paper analyzes a simple interaction between a terrorist and a target state. The aim
is to gain insights on how the generation of “terror” from a successful attack can impact
the interaction between attacker and defender. There is no standard accepted definition of
terrorism, by either academics or practitioners. Sandler and Lapan (1988) define terrorism
as “the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence or force to gain a political objective through intimidation or fear” (p. 247). The U.S. Department of State uses
the definition set forth in Section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the United States Code, which
defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (U.S. Department of State,
2016; p. 406). Arce, Kovenock, and Roberson (2012) define it as “a form of asymmetric
conflict in which terrorists utilize violent actions against (mainly civilian) noncombatants to
influence a target audience beyond the immediate victims” (p. 457). A common thread of
these and other definitions of terrorism is that the violent acts are intended to cause harm
to or instill fear in the general population of the target country. This recognition begins to
truly differentiate terrorism from traditional warfare.
For decades, the tools of game theory and theoretical economics have been used to analyze the behavior of terrorists as rational decision makers. Sandler and Arce (2007) present
an extensive survey of this literature, while Sandler and Siqueira (2009) summarize more
recent findings. As noted by Phillips (2016), terrorists behave very capably and rationally
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with respect to their operational objectives, which include generating media coverage and
gathering grassroots support (pp. 1-2). In contrast to traditional military conflict, in which
civilians may be inadvertently harmed or subjected to psychological fear via collateral damage, in a setting of true terrorism the imposition of such costs on third party civilians is
direct and intentional. It would therefore seem reasonable to explicitly build such effects
into any model of terrorism, something which, from a modeling perspective, has not been
done in most analyses of terrorism.
In the present model a single terrorist will potentially attack a single target in the homeland of a single state. The government of the state can allocate defensive resources to reduce
the probability with which a staged attack successfully destroys the target. The government
incurs costs of increasing defensive efforts, plus realizes a loss if the target is successfully attacked. In expectation, this loss is equal to the government’s value for the target multiplied
by the probability with which a staged attack is successful. If the terrorist chooses to stage
an attack, he incurs a cost of doing so, plus realizes a benefit if the target is successfully
attacked. In expectation, this benefit is equal to the terrorist’s value for the target multiplied by the probability with which a staged attack is successful. This setup shares many
features with, but is actually much more simplified than, models specified and analyzed by:
Bier, Oliveros, and Samuelson (2007); Powell (2007a); Powell (2007b); Sandler and Siqueira
(2009); and Zhuang and Bier (2007).
However, in each of these cited studies, the terrorist’s fundamental value for the target
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is not allowed to directly depend upon the amount of defensive resources allocated to the
target. This unrealistic simplifying assumption is a shortcoming of these models. In contrast,
in the model developed herein, the terrorist’s intrinsic benefit from successfully attacking the
target is allowed to be larger when the government devotes more defense resources to the
target. The amount by which the terrorist’s benefit is increased above its baseline as a result
of increased defensive efforts by the government can be thought of as a “terror effect.” With
respect to attacker-defender interactions defined as terrorism, there are several reasonable
interpretations for this more general setup, including situations in which: (i) citizens of
the target country are terrified to a greater degree when a more heavily fortified target is
successfully attacked or (ii) successfully attacking a more heavily fortified target allows the
terrorists to recruit more effectively. The presence of such a terror effect differentiates this
model of terrorism from a model of traditional conflict in a meaningful way. The ultimate
aim is to acquire preliminary insights on how attacker and defender behaviors, as well as
the outcome which results from their interaction, are influenced by the inclusion of and
magnitude of this terror effect.
The results of this analysis also provide some new perspectives on the notion of the
“weakest link,” which is one of the pillars of the terrorism literature – see Enders and
Sandler (2011) for an overview of this concept. The weakest link is the target that terrorists
identify, rank, and attack among several potential targets, precisely because it is the easiest
one to attack. This means that the least defended potential target becomes the terrorists’
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favorite target. The term weakest link was introduced by Hirshleifer (1983) in a more general
context of public goods in which the common level of consumption is equal to the lowest
level provided by different members of society – he presents an example of a circular island
prone to flooding, noting that the vulnerability to flooding for the entire island is dictated
by the lowest level of dike constructed by an individual property owner around the perimeter
of the island. In the context of terrorism, the idea was perfectly synthesized by IRA after
their failed attack to kill Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher: “Today you have been lucky.
But you have to be lucky every time. We only have to be lucky once.” (King 2008).
The weakest link is important because it is the natural target chosen when the terrorist
substitution effect takes place – for example, as noted by Mathews and Lowenberg (2012,
p. 195), “if tougher measures are taken against skyjackings or attacks on airports, terrorists
may instead target trains; if security at embassies is improved, terrorists may switch to
kidnappings.” There is ample empirical evidence, such as Enders and Sandler (1993, 1995)
and Sandler and Enders (2004), documenting that terrorists often behave rationally and do
in fact respond to changes in relevant costs and benefits. Specifically, Enders and Sandler
(1993) showed that while plane hijackings were reduced after the introduction of metal
detectors in airports, other kinds of terrorist hostage takings became more frequent (see also
Bueno de Mesquita (2016, p. 201) for a further discussion). Moreover, as noted by Davis
(2001) and analyzed by Heal and Kunreuther (2005), terrorists determined to attack airports
may look for a weak link related to airport security – such as baggage screening – so as to
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circumvent other more effective defensive barriers. The downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over
Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 was due to a bomb that was contained in a bag initially screened
in Malta, thereby constituting the weak link.
New York’s twin towers were attacked in 1993 with vans full of bombs. After this initial
attack, one would expect an increase of security measures to decrease the likelihood of
another attack in the future. That is, the hardening of the target would be expected to
reduce the net benefits to terrorist groups from attacking the target again. However, just
the opposite happened. Al Qaeda attacks of US embassies in Africa on August 7, 1998 (in
Dar es Salam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya) seemed to suggest that they were refining their
vehicle bombing skills by attacking protected buildings with trucks full of explosives. So, if
they would ever attack the twin towers again, this would probably be their preferred method.
More curiously, the subsequent attack on 9/11 – using commercial jets as missiles to destroy
the buildings – used a completely new tactic.
By again attacking the twin towers on 9/11, Al Qaeda stuck with their favorite target
in spite of the potential hardening of defensive measures to secure the buildings. This begs
the question: why attack a more heavily fortified target? The results of the present analysis
suggest that the answer could be related to the reward from a successful attack. In simple
terms, a successful attack against a fortified target yields an aura of power and invincibility
to the terrorist group, which increases public support and facilitates recruitment – see, for
example, Faria and Arce (2005, 2012). Moreover it instills fear in the victims, which is
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the primary objective of terrorism. As noted by King (2008): “terrorism actually affects
relatively few people directly, but many people indirectly...transnational terrorism has killed
about 500 people a year since 2001. But this figure is dwarfed by those who have felt the
fear these attacks were designed to create. This is the purpose of terror attacks - for each
person killed, frighten thousands more.” So, it might not be that the terrorists chose to stick
with their preferred target in spite of the increased defensive resources allocated to it, but
rather that they chose, in part, to again attack the target because the increased defensive
resources allocated to the target made it more attractive and valuable for the terrorists.
Even though the present model has only one single target, it is related to the weakest link
terrorism literature by payoff asymmetries between terrorists and governments inherent in
both setups. As highlighted by Arce, Kovenock, and Roberson (2012), there are “structural
asymmetries” between terrorist attackers and defenders, in that in each period the terrorist’s
objective is to simply successfully attack any one single target, whereas the government’s
objective is to prevent any successful attack over all potential targets. The consequences of
this asymmetric and discrete “one strike and you’re out” nature of the payoffs on electoral accountability is examined empirically by Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, and Mierau (2008). Within
a weakest link environment, Arce, Kovenock, and Roberson (2012) consider the choice of a
terrorist who can allocate suicide attackers to different targets, in addition to conventional
resources. They highlight the ultimate importance of these payoff asymmetries in regards
to the effectiveness of suicide attacks from the perspective of the terrorist and conclude that
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“Governments would do well by deemphasizing the importance of an individual attack and
continuing with everyday life, as is often the case in Europe, whereas US policy continues to
be cast in terms of publicly emphasizing terrorists’ success” (p. 467). That is, a terrorist’s
effectiveness could be reduced if the terror generated by individual successful attacks could
somehow be effectively downplayed by a government. This insight touches on the fundamental importance of the way in which terror generated from an attack impacts the payoffs
and strategy choices of both attackers and defenders. Such impacts of terror on payoffs are
explicitly built-in to the attacker-defender model analyzed here.
Parallels can also be drawn between the present study and the model of a contest with
“spillover effects” analyzed by Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (2012), in which the fundamental payoff of a player is directly dependent upon the level of effort chosen by his rival (as
opposed to a traditional contest model in which the impact is only an indirect one due to
a rival’s effort altering the probabilistic contest outcomes).1 They show how such spillover
effects alter the equilibrium levels of effort and payoffs, under a wide array of different costs
structures (covering myriad applications such as innovation contests, partnership dissolution,
litigations, and various types of price competition). In their general specification a player’s
payoff is such that a constant marginal cost (or subsidy) is directly realized as a function of
the level of effort chosen by his rival. The model developed and analyzed here is similar in
that increased effort by the defender is allowed to directly alter the payoff of the attacker,
1

Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (2005) uses tools of auction theory to analyze a special case of strategic
choice of legal expenditures in the context of litigation under different cost sharing rules.
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however the effect manifests itself by altering the value that the attacker places on the target
(as opposed to entering the payoff function as a constant cost or subsidy in proportion to
the rival’s chosen effort level). Moreover, Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (2012) examined a
simultaneous choice of effort (whereas the present model considers a sequential choice) by
players that are a priori symmetric and only differentiated form one another based upon the
outcome of the contest (whereas the present model has players that are a priori asymmetric – an attacker and a defender – who have fundamentally different roles in the game and
different payoff functions).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. A very simple attacker-defender
model is specified in Section 2 as a sequential move game. The specified game is analyzed in
Section 3. Within this analysis it is shown that the amount of defensive efforts necessary to
prevent the terrorist from staging an attack is increasing in the magnitude of the terror effect
and the unique Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the complete information version of
this game is identified. An environment in which the government inaccurately under perceives
the true magnitude of the terror effect is considered in Section 4. It is shown that in such
situations, the government may possibly choose either less than or, somewhat surprisingly,
more than the optimal level of defense. These insights highlight the importance for correctly
understanding the payoffs and motives of terrorists when choosing levels of defensive efforts.
Section 5 briefly concludes.
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2

Model Specification

These points will be made in the simplest possible environment, in which a single terrorist
organization contemplates staging an attack on a single target within the homeland of a
single state. Consider a sequential interaction in which a defender – the government of the
target state, denoted G – first allocates resources (in Stage 1) to reduce the probability with
which an attack staged on the target is successful. After observing the level of defensive
efforts set by the defender, an attacker – the terrorists, denoted T – chooses (in Stage 2)
to either launch an attack on the target or not. In Stage 1, G allocates defensive resources
to essentially choose p ∈ [0, 1], which denotes the probability that an attack launched on
the target is thwarted. Thus, 1 − p is the probability that a launched attack is successful.
The costs to G of expending resources to defend the target are given by CG (p) and, once
resources are allocated, these costs must be incurred regardless of whether or not an attack
is ultimately staged by T . Assume: CG (0) = 0, CG0 (p) > 0, and CG00 (p) > 0. If the target is
successfully attacked, G incurs a loss of VG . Thus, the expected payoff of G can be expressed
as:
ΠG (p) =


 −(1 − p)VG − CG (p)


−CG (p)

,

if an attack is staged

,

if no attack is staged

In Stage 2, T chooses to either stage an attack or not. Staging an attack is assumed
to be a discrete choice which entails a quasi-fixed cost of FT which is only incurred if an
attack is staged. A successful attack gives T a benefit of VT (p). Assume VT (0) = VT > 0
and VT0 (p) ≥ 0. Recognize that VT0 (p) = 0 covers the standard case in which the value that
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T places on the target is a constant (independent of the amount of resources allocated to
defense by G). In contrast, VT0 (p) > 0 corresponds to a situation in which T places greater
value on a target that is more heavily defended, in which case VT (p) > VT for all p > 0. The
expected payoff of T can be expressed as:

ΠT (p) =


 (1 − p)VT (p) − FT


0

,

if an attack is staged

,

if no attack is staged

Recognize that the payoff function of T contains a benefit from a successful attack that
is segmented into two distinct portions, a value to the terrorist from a successful attack
multiplied by the probability of the attack being successful: (1 − p)VT (p). Decomposing
the benefit in this manner allows us to highlight the distinct way in which our specification
allows this terror effect to enter into the analysis.
As G allocates additional resources to defending the target, the value of p is increased,
which directly decreases the expected benefit for T of staging an attack (i.e., (1 − p) is
decreased). However, these additional resources serve to augment the value of the target
to T , increasing VT (p) above its baseline of VT (0). For example, suppose that a successful
attack on the target has an expected impact of one hundred casualties. If T does not care at
all about “generating terror,” then the value of this attack would be the same regardless of
how heavily defended the target is. That is, the value of VT should be constant for all p ≥ 0.
If instead T does care about generating terror and, moreover, a greater amount of terror is
generated when this same outcome of one hundred casualties is realized when a more heavily
fortified target is successfully attacked, then the value of this attack should be increasing in
10

the level of defense by G. That is, the value of VT should be increasing in p. From here, it
is apparent how segmenting the benefit to T from staging an attack into these two distinct
portions, specified as (1 − p)VT (p), allows for the incorporation of such a terror effect in a
straightforward manner. It is important to stress that the increase in VT (p) resulting from
a larger value of p being chosen by G is a true increase in value for T , as opposed to a
revelation of information or signal of greater value for the target by G.
Comparing two different functional forms of VT (p), denoted VThigh (p) and VTlow (p), the
magnitude of the terror effect is greater for VThigh (p) compared to VTlow (p) if VThigh (p) >
VTlow (p) for all p ∈ (0, 1]. While the analysis in Section 3 is conducted with minimal assumptions on VT (p), it is instructive to briefly consider a specific functional form to acquire an
p
understanding of how to interpret this function. Toward this end, consider VT (p) = VT +t 1−p

with t > 0, which will again be considered within Subsection 4.1.
For two different functions of this form defined by tlow and thigh , the terror effect is
greater for VThigh (p) than for VTlow (p) so long as tlow < thigh . From here, we can see how
this specification allows us to consider the generation of terror in a continuous, non-binary
manner. For example, many instances of guerrilla warfare, while not fitting a traditional
definition of terrorism, nonetheless deviate from traditional warfare with respect to their
impact on third party non-combatants. An interpretation of this model with a small terror
p
effect (e.g., a positive but relatively small value of t for VT (p) = VT + t 1−p
) would cover such

scenarios. In contrast, instances of straight-up terrorism such as the attack by Al Qaeda

11

on 9/11 would be covered by an interpretation of this same model with a large terror effect
p
(e.g., a relatively large value of t for VT (p) = VT + t 1−p
).

3

Equilibrium

Recognize that T has a strict preference for staging an attack in Stage 2 if and only if
(1 − p)VT (p) − FT > 0.2 Defining BT (p) = (1 − p)VT (p), this condition for staging an attack
is BT (p) > FT . Observe: BT (0) = VT (0) = VT > 0; BT0 (p) = −VT (p) + (1 − p)VT0 (p); and
BT00 (p) = −2VT0 (p) + (1 − p)VT00 (p). Restrict attention to functional forms of VT (p) for which
VT0 (p) <

VT (p)
,
1−p

so that BT0 (p) = −VT (p) + (1 − p)VT0 (p) < 0 for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Further assuming

FT < VT = BT (0) and FT > BT (1), it follows that there exists a unique p̄ ∈ (0, 1) such that
BT (p) > FT if and only if p < p̄. After G chooses a value of p in Stage 1, T will launch an
attack if and only if p < p̄. That is, G can dissuade T from staging an attack by choosing
sufficiently high defensive efforts, so that p ≥ p̄.
Proposition 1 provides a characterization of how the defensive efforts necessary to prevent
an attack depend upon the magnitude of the terror effect.

Proposition 1 If the magnitude of the terror effect is greater, then the amount of defensive
efforts by G necessary to prevent T from staging an attack is larger.

Proof. Consider VThigh (p) and VTlow (p) with VThigh (p) > VTlow (p) for all p ∈ (0, 1]. Let p̄high
and p̄low denote the resulting values of p̄ for VThigh (p) and VTlow (p) respectively. The cutoff p̄ is
2

For simplicity, assume T chooses to not attack when indifferent being doing so and not doing so.
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defined as the unique value of p for which BT (p) = FT . This condition is (1 − p)VT (p) = FT .
The value of FT does not depend upon p. Since VThigh (p) > VTlow (p) for all p ∈ (0, 1], it
follows that (1 − p)VThigh (p) > (1 − p)VTlow (p) for all p ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, p̄high > p̄low . Q.E.D.

Proposition 1 reveals a first important difference between environments of terrorism versus traditional conflict in which no terror effect is present. In an environment of traditional
conflict, VTlow (p) = VT for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Compared to this baseline, any positive terror effect,
no matter how small, will necessitate G having to choose a greater level of defense to induce
T to not stage an attack. Further, when a successful attack generates a terror benefit for T ,
the amount of defensive efforts which G must allocate to dissuade T from staging an attack
is increasing in the magnitude of the terror effect. That is, the range of values of p for which
T will find it optimal to launch an attack is wider when the magnitude of the terror effect
is greater.
Continuing to solve the game recursively, examine the choice of p by G in Stage 1. When
making this decision of how much to increase p, G must carefully balance the benefit of an
increased probability of thwarting an attack against the impact of the increased value of the
target for T which results from the terror effect. Define ΠGA (p) = −(1 − p)VG − CG (p) and
ΠGN (p) = −CG (p). These functions are simply the payoff to G if an attack is staged by T
and the payoff to G if an attack is not staged by T , respectively. Under the assumptions and
observations thus far: (i) Π0GN (p) = −CG0 (p) < 0; (ii) ΠGN (p) > ΠGA (p) for all p ∈ [0, 1);
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(iii) Π0GA (p) = VG − CG0 (p); and (iv) Π00GA (p) = −CG00 (p) < 0. Figure 1 provides an illustration
of ΠGN (p) and ΠGA (p) satisfying these conditions.
By (iv), there exists a unique value of p ∈ [0, 1] which maximizes ΠGA (p); denote this
axGA
value of p by pM
. (The subscript “GA” stresses that this value of p is identified based
GA

upon the function ΠGA (p), while the superscript “M axGA” highlights that it is the value of
p for which the function ΠGA (p) achieves its maximum value.) By (i), there exists a unique

axGA
axGA
value of p for which ΠGN (p) = ΠGA pM
; denote this value of p by pM
. (The
GA
GN
subscript “GN ” stresses that this value of p is identified based upon the function ΠGN (p),
while the superscript “M axGA” highlights that it is directly determined by the maximum
axGA
axGA
value of the function ΠGA (p).) Figure 1 provides an illustration of pM
and pM
in
GA
GN

relation to the functions ΠGN (p) and ΠGA (p).
Focusing on the payoff of G, recognize that ΠG (p) = ΠGA (p) for p < p̄ whereas ΠG (p) =
ΠGN (p) for p ≥ p̄. Consequently, there is a discontinuity in ΠG (p) at p = p̄ with the value
of the function strictly increasing at p = p̄. Since ΠGN (p) is decreasing in p, it follows that
the value of p ∈ [p̄, 1] that maximizes ΠG (p) is p∗N = p̄. Because of the concave nature of
axGA
; and
ΠGA (p), the value of p ∈ [0, p̄) that maximizes ΠG (p): is p∗A = p̄ − ε if p̄ ≤ pM
GA
axGA
axGA
is p∗A = pM
if p̄ > pM
. Comparing the value of ΠGN (p∗N ) to ΠGA (p∗A ), in order to
GA
GA

determine the overall optimal choice of p by G, reveals that the equilibrium of this game is
as summarized by the following proposition (stated without proof, since it follows from the
discussion up to this point).
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Proposition 2 The unique Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this sequential move game

axGA
p̄
, if p̄ ≤ pM

GN
Stage 1: G will choose p∗ =
 M axGA
axGA
pGA
, if p̄ > pM
is as follows:
GN
Stage 2:

T will launch an attack ⇔ p∗ < p̄

axGA
In terms of the observed outcome: if p̄ ≤ pM
, then G will choose p∗ = p̄ and T will
GN
axGA
axGA
not launch an attack; whereas if p̄ > pM
, then G will choose p∗ = pM
and T will
GN
GA

launch an attack.

4

Inaccurate Perceptions of Terror Effect

The preceding analysis considered a situation of complete information, in which the magnitude of any terror effect – and therefore the payoff function of each player – was common
knowledge between the two players. For the remainder of the paper we alternatively consider
an environment of incomplete information in which G has an inaccurate perception or belief
about the true magnitude of the terror effect for T . Attention is restricted to situations
in which G is certain in his beliefs, but under perceives the true magnitude of the terror
effect, covering the case of G not recognizing any terror effect when one is in fact present.
Considering such simplistically yet grossly misguided beliefs is instructive, since it will be
shown that such an under perception of the terror effect by G can lead him to choose a
sub-optimal level of defense that is either less than or, somewhat counterintuitively, greater
than the true optimal level of defense.
More precisely, suppose the true payoff function of T is defined by VT (p) = VThigh (p),
15

but G incorrectly believes that VT (p) = VTlow (p), with VTlow (p) < VThigh (p) for all p ∈ (0, 1].
Consequently, G incorrectly believes that the relevant cutoff probability is p̄low , when in fact
it is p̄high with p̄high > p̄low . As summarized in Table 1, four distinct cases – each with a
qualitatively unique set of outcomes – are possible, based upon the relation between p̄low ,
axGA
axGA
p̄high , pM
, and pM
.
GA
GN

In Case I the true optimal value of p is p̄high , which is the actual minimum value of p for
which T would choose to not launch an attack. However, since G incorrectly under perceives
the magnitude of the terror effect, he thinks that a lower choice of only p̄low is sufficient to
induce T to not attack. Thus, G under defends the target, thinking that the lower level of
defense is sufficient to prevent T from attacking (when in fact T will still choose to attack).
axGA
. This is because, given the actual
For Case II the true optimal value of p is pM
GA

magnitude of the true terror effect, the minimum level of p which dissuades T from attacking
is so high that it is optimal for G to simply choose the value of p which maximizes ΠGA (p)
(for which T will choose to stage an attack). But, G under perceives the true magnitude of
the terror effect to such a substantial degree that he chooses a value of p even lower than
axGA
pM
(specifically, p̄low ) expecting that this will be sufficient to prevent T from attacking
GA

(when in fact T will still choose to attack). Comparing Case I with Case II, while these
cases differ in regards to the true optimal choice of p, they are similar in that in each case:
G chooses p = p̄low ; the chosen level of defense by G is less than the true optimal level of
defense; and G chooses a level of defense that he thinks will be sufficient to dissuade T from
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attacking, but for which T actually chooses to attack. The non-optimal choice of level of
defense and the subsequent unanticipated choice by T to stage an attack are each a direct
consequence of G under perceiving the true magnitude of the terror effect.
axGA
Next consider Case III, for which the true optimal value of p is again pM
. As in
GA

Case II, this choice is optimal because, given the actual magnitude of the true terror effect,
the minimum level of p which would prevent an attack is so high that it is optimal for G to
choose the value of p which maximizes ΠGA (p) (for which T will choose to stage an attack).
But, given the perceptions of the magnitude of the terror effect by G, he incorrectly believes
that a choice of only p̄low will be sufficient to dissuade T from attacking. However, when
G chooses the corresponding level of defense – which is a level of defense greater than that
axGA
– an attack is subsequently staged by T .
associated with the true optimal value of pM
GA

Thus, in Case III the under perception of the magnitude of the terror effect by G induces
him to choose a level of defense that is greater than the optimal level of defense.
This sub-optimal over provision of defense in Case III is somewhat counterintuitive since
a larger terror effect directly increases the benefit of a successful attack for T , which in an
environment of diametrically opposed interests, such as the attacker-defender model being
considered, would seemingly make a greater allocation of defensive resources by G optimal.
While it is correct that as the magnitude of the terror effect is increased it is necessary for
G to choose an ever larger level of defense to dissuade T from staging an attack, it does not
follow that the optimal level of defense is always increasing in the magnitude of the terror
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axGA
effect. When p̄ becomes greater than pM
the amount of defensive resources necessary
GN

to dissuade T from staging an attack become so large and costly that it is better for G to
axGA
choose p = pM
(for which an attack will be staged) instead of p = p̄. In Case III the
GA
axGA
perceived and actual cutoff values of p̄ straddle this behavioral threshold of pM
. Since
GN
axGA
G perceives the cutoff to be plow < pM
he chooses this value, incorrectly expecting that
GN

it will be sufficient to dissuade T from staging an attack. However, since the true cutoff is
axGA
axGA
phigh > pM
, it follows that the true optimal choice for G is p = pM
(i.e., the value
GN
GA

of p which maximizes ΠGA (p)). In this case, the under perception of the true magnitude of
the terror effect by G leads him to choose a higher level of defense than is actually optimal.
This over defense of the target, along with the unanticipated choice by T to stage an attack,
is a direct consequence of the inaccurate beliefs by G.
axGA
Finally consider Case IV , for which both p̄low and p̄high exceed pM
. Even though
GN

G under perceives the true magnitude of the terror effect, he “correctly” recognizes that
choosing the level of defense necessary to dissuade T from staging an attack would give
axGA
axGA
him a lower payoff than simply choosing p = pM
. Thus, G chooses p = pM
, which
GA
GA

corresponds to the optimal level of defense, and T chooses to stage an attack as anticipated.
In summary, an under perception of the true magnitude of the terror effect by G can
either: cause him to choose less than the optimal amount of defense (Cases I and II); cause
him to choose more than the optimal amount of defense (Case III); or not alter the amount
of chosen defense away from the optimal (Case IV ). When the chosen level of defense is
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not equal to the true optimal level (i.e., Cases I, II, and III), T will end up staging an
attack which G does not anticipate. Since such a disconnect between the expected and actual
behavior by T could never occur in the complete information environment, we see that a
misperception of the magnitude of the terror effect can be a root cause of a terror attack
occurring even when G thinks that he has sufficiently hardened the target to the point of
dissuading T from attacking. In contrast, an under perception of the true magnitude of the
terror effect can never result in T choosing to not stage an attack when G expects an attack
to be staged. When G under perceives the true magnitude of the terror effect, the only
instance in which the ultimate behavior of T in Stage 2 coincides with the expectations of G
is in Case IV . In this situation even though G incorrectly perceives the full magnitude of the
terror effect, he “correctly” resigns himself to the fact that it is better to simply choose the
optimal level of defense for which an attack will be staged as opposed to allocating sufficient
defensive resources to dissuade an attack.

4.1

Exempli Gratia

A simple example illustrates that each of the four cases discussed thus far is possible.
Consider CG (p) =

p
c
1−p

with c > 0, for which: CG (0) = 0; CG0 (p) = (1 − p)−2 c > 0;

and CG00 (p) = 2(1 − p)−3 c > 0. Assume c < VG , so that Π0GA (0) = VG − c > 0. The
axGA
unique value of p for which Π0GA (p) = 0 is pM
= 1−
GA
axGA
ΠGA pM
GA



ΠGN (p) = ΠGA

q

c
VG

> 0. Consequently,

√
√
√ 
axGA
= − c 2 VG − c . Since pM
is the unique value of p for which
GN
axGA
pM
GA



, it follows that

axGA
pM
GN
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=1−

1
2

q

c
.
VG

p
Suppose VT (p) = VT + t 1−p
with t > 0 parameterizing the terror effect. For t = 0

we have VT (p) = VT (i.e., no terror effect). Observing

∂VT (p)
∂t

=

p
1−p

> 0 reveals that a

larger value of t is consistent with a terror effect of greater magnitude. For this functional
form, BT (p) = (1 − p)VT (p) = (1 − p)VT + pt. To satisfy the assumption that BT0 (p) < 0,
restrict attention to t < VT . The cutoff value p̄ is defined as the unique value of p for which
BT (p) = FT , which is p̄ =
and p̄high =

VT −FT
VT −t

. For tlow and thigh (with tlow < thigh ), we have p̄low =

VT −FT
VT −tlow

VT −FT
.
VT −thigh

axGA
axGA
Since the thresholds pM
and pM
depend upon only c and VG , while the cutoffs
GA
GN

p̄low and p̄high depend upon the distinct set of parameters tlow , thigh , VT , and FT , it is
straightforward to choose values to yield each of the four possible cases summarized in Table
axGA
=
1. Assume c = 1 and VG = 4, for which pM
GA

1
2

axGA
= 34 . Case I is obtained for
and pM
GN

axGA
any triple of thigh , VT , and FT satisfying p̄high < pM
, which reduces to VT + 3thigh < 4FT ;
GN

for example, VT = 2, FT = 45 , along with any thigh < 1.
Continuing to assume c = 1 and VG = 4, a common requirement for Cases II, III,
axGA
and IV is p̄high > pM
, which can be expressed as VT + 3thigh > 4FT . Case II arises if
GN
axGA
, which can be expressed as tlow < 2FT − VT . Again considering
additionally p̄low < pM
GA

VT = 2 and FT = 45 , we obtain Case II for any tlow <

1
2

and thigh > 1. Case III results if



axGA M axGA
additionally p̄low ∈ pM
, pGN
, which can be stated as tlow ∈ 2FT − VT , 4FT3−VT . For
GA
VT = 2 and FT = 54 , we get Case III for any tlow ∈
axGA
requires p̄low > pM
or, equivalently, tlow >
GN
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1
,1
2

4FT −VT
3



and thigh > 1. Case IV additionally

. With VT = 2 and FT = 54 , we realize

Case IV for any tlow > 1.

5

Conclusion

This study begins to shed light on the direct importance of terror generation on attackerdefender interactions. A core characteristic of terrorism is that its violent acts are intended
to instill intimidation or fear in civilians. Thus, the gain to a terrorist from successfully
attacking a target is not simply the value of the target itself, but will often include benefits
related to the generation of fear in the target population and positive recruitment effects.
These additional gains would reasonably be greater when a more heavily fortified target
is successfully attacked. In contrast to previous models of terrorism, the attacker-defender
model developed and analyzed here explicitly allows for such a “terror effect.”
A single terrorist, T , will potentially attack a single target in the homeland of a government, G. T ’s benefit from a successful attack is allowed to be increasing in the amount
of resources that G allocates to defense. The analysis reveals that the amount of defensive
efforts by G necessary to prevent T from staging an attack is increasing in the magnitude
of the terror effect. That is, rather intuitively, when a successful attack generates a large
terror benefit for the terrorist, the government will have to harden the target to a greater
degree in order to dissuade the terrorist from staging an attack. Subsequently, the impact
of inaccurate perceptions on the part of the G regarding the magnitude of the terror effect
is examined. It is shown that an under perception of the true magnitude of the terror effect
by G can cause him to either under defend or, somewhat surprisingly, over defend the target
21

(with the realized outcome depending upon model parameters). These insights highlight the
importance of accurately gauging the payoffs and motives of terrorists in order to be able
to optimally allocate defensive resources. That is, misperceiving the magnitude of such a
terror effect can cause a government to allocate defensive resources at a sub-optimal level.
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TABLE 1
summary of possible outcomes with inaccurate perceptions of terror effect
Case Conditions

Choice Optimal
Characterization
by G
Choice
G under defends
p low
p high

I

MaxGA
p high  pGN

II

MaxGA
MaxGA
p high  pGN
& plow  pGA

plow

MaxGA
pGA

G under defends

III

MaxGA
MaxGA
MaxGA
p high  pGN
& pGA
 plow  pGN

plow

MaxGA
pGA

G over defends

IV

MaxGA
MaxGA
& plow  pGN
p high  pGN

MaxGA
pGA

MaxGA
pGA

G chooses optimally

